Arbeitspapier

Ordinal Games

We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 07/74

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Ordinal Games
Potential Games
Quasi-Supermodularity
Rationalizable Sets
Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Durieu, Jacques
Haller, Hans
Querou, Nicolas
Solal, Philippe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2007

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005502934
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Durieu, Jacques
  • Haller, Hans
  • Querou, Nicolas
  • Solal, Philippe
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2007

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