Ordinal Games

Arbeitspapier

We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 07/74

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Ordinal Games ; Potential Games ; Quasi-Supermodularity ; Rationalizable Sets ; Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Durieu, Jacques ; Haller, Hans ; Querou, Nicolas ; Solal, Philippe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005502934
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171517
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET