Arbeitspapier
Ordinal Games
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 07/74
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Ordinal Games
Potential Games
Quasi-Supermodularity
Rationalizable Sets
Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Durieu, Jacques
Haller, Hans
Querou, Nicolas
Solal, Philippe
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005502934
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Durieu, Jacques
- Haller, Hans
- Querou, Nicolas
- Solal, Philippe
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2007