Arbeitspapier
Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 395
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Antitrust Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
corporate leniency program
cartel
leniency application delays
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gärtner, Dennis L.
Zhou, Jun
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.14315
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14315-4
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gärtner, Dennis L.
- Zhou, Jun
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2012