Arbeitspapier

Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?

This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 395

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Antitrust Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
corporate leniency program
cartel
leniency application delays

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gärtner, Dennis L.
Zhou, Jun
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.14315
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14315-4
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gärtner, Dennis L.
  • Zhou, Jun
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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