Arbeitspapier

Rollover risk, liquidity, and macro-prudential regulation

I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex-ante and are subject to fire sales ex-post. I demonstrate that precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and an efficient equilibrium. I provide a uniqueness refinement to characterize the privately optimal liquidity choice. Because of fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free-ride on the liquidity of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. A macro-prudential authority internalizes the systemic nature of liquidity and restores constrained efficiency by imposing a macro-prudential liquidity buffer.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1667

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
global games
multiplicity
portfolio choice
wholesale funding

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ahnert, Toni
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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