Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future

Arbeitspapier

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding, discuss its applicability in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2897

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: conflict ; litigation ; property rights ; folk theorem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): McBride, Michael ; Skaperdas, Stergios
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30428
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET