Arbeitspapier

Pairwise stable matching in large economies

We formulate a general model and stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. These characteristics can be high-dimensional and need not be included in compact spaces. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers and stable matchings correspond exactly to limits of stable matchings for finite agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities. This might pave the way for integrating matching problems in other economic models.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2018-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
Thema
stable matching
economies in distributional form
large markets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Greinecker, Michael
Kah, Christopher
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Greinecker, Michael
  • Kah, Christopher
  • University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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