Arbeitspapier

Regulatory Arbitrage and the Efficiency of Banking Regulation

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5878

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
regulatory arbitrage
banking regulation
regulatory competition
financial integration
asymmetric information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boyer, Pierre C.
Kempf, Hubert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boyer, Pierre C.
  • Kempf, Hubert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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