Arbeitspapier
Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
We investigate the bearings product market collusion on the abatement of polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate the feedback solution of two alternative settings: a fully noncooperative oligopoly and a cartel maximising the discounted profits of all firms in the industry. Our analysis proves that the output reduction entailed by collusive behaviour may have a benefiacial effect on steady state welfare, as a result of the balance between a higher market price and a lower amount of polluting emissions. This result opens a new prespective on the debate about the management of environmental externalities, which so far has mainly focussed on the design of Pigouvian taxation schemes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 615
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4635
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2007
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