Arbeitspapier

Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 661

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor Contracts
Subject
efficiency wages
monitoring
Effizienzlohn
Leistungskontrolle
Reallohn
Schätzung
Ghana

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Strobl, Eric
Walsh, Frank A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Strobl, Eric
  • Walsh, Frank A.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2003

Other Objects (12)