Arbeitspapier
Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this effect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase the cost of deterrence.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 14-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Antitrust Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Thema
-
antitrust
cartels
deterrence
leniency
evidence
Wettbewerbspolitik
Straffreiheit
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Strafe
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blatter, Marc
Emons, Winand
Sticher, Silvio
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blatter, Marc
- Emons, Winand
- Sticher, Silvio
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014
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