Arbeitspapier
On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations
This paper investigates the sequential announcement of domestic emissions caps by regulators in a federal or international-based tradable pollution permit market for a transboundary pollutant. A leader-follower framework is used to analyse the consequences of regulators sequentially announcing domestic allocation caps. We find the sequential choice of domestic allocation caps is sub-optimal and depends on the follower's reaction to the leader's choice. Furthermore, the marginal damage and the degree to which allocations are substitutes or complements affects whether the leader changes from being a net permit buyer (seller) of permits to a seller (buyer).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 08/83
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Initial allocation
international tradable permit market
leader-follower
Emissionshandel
Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung
Allokation
Duopol
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
MacKenzie, Ian A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005562742
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- MacKenzie, Ian A.
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2008
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