Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ

Arbeitspapier

Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals? preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982), the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals? well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1429

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• Subject: optimal taxation ; behavioral economics ; paternalism ; merit goods ; non-welfarism ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Einkommensumverteilung ; Steuersystem ; Meritorisches Gut ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Blomquist, Sören ; Micheletto, Luca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18793
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET