Konferenzbeitrag

Settlement Offers

We analyze how early settlement offers affect Nash bargaining outcomes when agents are asymmetrically informed about the distribution of bargaining powers and exhibit expectations-based loss-aversion preferences. Before the start of the bargaining process, the sender has private information about the receiver’s bargaining power. His settlement offers may convey this private information so that they change the receiver’s expectations and, by loss aversion, preferences. We show that the sender can exploit this mechanism by making non-binding settlement offers, i.e., the receiver is free to accept them at any time, even after learning her true bargaining value.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Bargaining and Participation Constraints ; No. B04-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Contract Law

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schumacher, Heiner
Karle, Heiko
Volund, Rune
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel und Hamburg
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Schumacher, Heiner
  • Karle, Heiko
  • Volund, Rune
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2016

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