Out of Communal Land: Clientelism through Delegation of Agricultural Tenancy Contracts

Arbeitspapier

Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive usufruct rights over a piece of communal village land (bengkok land) as a compensation for their service in lieu of salary. To formulate how limited-term private ownership of bengkok land promotes clientelism, we model a timely delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts to villagers-cum-voters as an incumbent re-election strategy. Based on a household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 villages in Java, Indonesia, we find that the chances of a bengkok plot being rented out increase by 6 percentage points as the time of the next election becomes closer by one year, and sharecropping is preferred to a fixed-rental contract as the election approaches. The empirical results are statistically significant and remain largely unchanged against a series of robustness checks. We also find suggestive evidence of short-term efficiency loss from clientelist politics over bengkok land.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14263

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements ; Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
• Subject: tanah bengkok ; political budget cycle ; clientelism ; agricultural tenancy ; electoral competition ; Indonesia

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kurosaki, Takashi ; Paul, Saumik ; Witoelar, Firman
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/236294
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET