Arbeitspapier
Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties
We characterize the optimal policy and policy instruments for self-enforcing treaties when countries invest in green technology before they pollute. If the discount factor is too small to support the first best, then both emissions and investments will be larger than in the first best, when technology is expensive. When technology is inexpensive, countries must instead limit or tax green investment in order to make future punishment credible. We also uncover a novel advantage of price regulation over quantity regulation, namely that when regulation is sufficiently flexible to permit firms to react to non-compliance in another country, the temptation to defect is reduced. The model is tractable and allows for multiple extensions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8460
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
climate change
environmental agreements
green technology
policy instruments
repeated games
compliance
self-enforcing treaties
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Harstad, Bård
Lancia, Francesco
Russo, Alessia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Harstad, Bård
- Lancia, Francesco
- Russo, Alessia
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020
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