Arbeitspapier

Mobile number portability

This paper examines the consequences of introducing mobile number portability (MNP). As MNP allows consumers to keep their telephone number when switching providers, it reduces consumers' switching costs. However, MNP may also cause consumer ignorance if telephone numbers no longer identify networks. As a result, while fostering competition for mobile customers, MNP may also induce operators to increase termination charges for calls to mobile networks, generating ambiguous welfare effects. We examine how extensions such as MNP based on call-forwarding, termination fee regulation, and alternative means of carrier identification affect these findings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 0303

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Subject
number portability
switching costs
telecommunications
network competition
Mobiltelefon
Telekommunikation
Wettbewerb
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Buehler, Stefan
Haucap, Justus
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Buehler, Stefan
  • Haucap, Justus
  • University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute

Time of origin

  • 2003

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