Arbeitspapier

Network Markets and Consumer Coordination

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A monopolist might operate multiple ex ante identical networks to price differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the market. Firms can obtain positive profits in price competition. Product differentiation in equilibrium is endogenized by consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria.

ISBN
9639588245
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Externalities
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Subject
two-sided markets
network externalities
platform competition
coordination
Netzwerkökonomik
Verbraucher
Koordination
Monopol
Duopol
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ambrus, Attila
Argenziano, Rossella
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(where)
Budapest
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ambrus, Attila
  • Argenziano, Rossella
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

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