Arbeitspapier

Network Markets and Consumer Coordination

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A monopolist might operate multiple ex ante identical networks to price differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the market. Firms can obtain positive profits in price competition. Product differentiation in equilibrium is endogenized by consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria.

ISBN
9639588245
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Externalities
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Thema
two-sided markets
network externalities
platform competition
coordination
Netzwerkökonomik
Verbraucher
Koordination
Monopol
Duopol
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ambrus, Attila
Argenziano, Rossella
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ambrus, Attila
  • Argenziano, Rossella
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2004

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