Arbeitspapier
Network Markets and Consumer Coordination
This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A monopolist might operate multiple ex ante identical networks to price differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the market. Firms can obtain positive profits in price competition. Product differentiation in equilibrium is endogenized by consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria.
- ISBN
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9639588245
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/23
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Externalities
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- Subject
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two-sided markets
network externalities
platform competition
coordination
Netzwerkökonomik
Verbraucher
Koordination
Monopol
Duopol
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ambrus, Attila
Argenziano, Rossella
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ambrus, Attila
- Argenziano, Rossella
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2004