Arbeitspapier

Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework

The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 10-082

Classification
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subject
competition policy
monopolisation
predation
enforcement
Wettbewerbspolitik
Verdrängungswettbewerb
Wirkungsanalyse
Duopol
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hüschelrath, Kai
Weigand, Jürgen
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hüschelrath, Kai
  • Weigand, Jürgen
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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