Arbeitspapier
Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework
The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 10-082
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Subject
-
competition policy
monopolisation
predation
enforcement
Wettbewerbspolitik
Verdrängungswettbewerb
Wirkungsanalyse
Duopol
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hüschelrath, Kai
Weigand, Jürgen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (where)
-
Mannheim
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hüschelrath, Kai
- Weigand, Jürgen
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Time of origin
- 2010