Arbeitspapier
Agency problems and goal conflicts
Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions. Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk. The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-24
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Bankenaufsicht
Bankenregulierung
Einlagensicherung
Eurozone
EU-Staaten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eisenbeis, Robert A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
- (wo)
-
Atlanta, GA
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eisenbeis, Robert A.
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Entstanden
- 2004
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