Arbeitspapier

Income Distribution, Borrowing Constraints and Redistributive Policies

This paper proposes an explanation for why universal suffrage has not implied larger rich-to-poor transfers of wealth. The main argument is that, in the presence of borrowing constraints, if current taxation finances (at least partially) policies that redistribute future income, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution. In this context, the effects of an increase in income inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class. In the former case, an increase in inequality tends to decrease redistribution, whereas, in the latter case, it tends to increase redistribution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 359

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Berti Ceroni, Carlotta
Bellettini, Giorgio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
1999

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4950
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Berti Ceroni, Carlotta
  • Bellettini, Giorgio
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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