Arbeitspapier

Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute terms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2010-35

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Overconfidence
Contests
Vertrauen
Persönlichkeitspsychologie
Wettbewerb
Arbeitsleistung
Extensives Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
München
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.11885
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-11885-3
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ludwig, Sandra
  • Wichardt, Philipp C.
  • Wickhorst, Hanke
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2010

Other Objects (12)