Arbeitspapier
Labor market regulation and the legal system
When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2041
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Labor Law
- Subject
-
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Arbeitsrechtsprechung
Risiko
Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung
Schätzung
OECD-Staaten
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Neugart, Michael
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2007
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