Arbeitspapier
The simple geometry of perfect information games
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 115
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
perfect information
subgame perfection
equilibrium correspondence
Spieltheorie
Vollkommene Information
Theorie
Gleichgewicht
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Demichelis, Stefano
Ritzberger, Klaus
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
-
Vienna
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Demichelis, Stefano
- Ritzberger, Klaus
- Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2002
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