Arbeitspapier

Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7880

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
tragedy of the commons
dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
self-image
categorical imperative

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Long, Ngo Van
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Long, Ngo Van
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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