Arbeitspapier
Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters
The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7880
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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tragedy of the commons
dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
self-image
categorical imperative
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Long, Ngo Van
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Long, Ngo Van
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2019