Arbeitspapier
When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries
In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it is shown that the presence of strong network effects makes unionisation the Pareto-efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms. The issue of entry is also investigated.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2017-9
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Subject
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unionised oligopoly
competitive labour market
efficient bargaining
market entry and entry deterrence
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fanti, Luciano
Buccella, Domenico
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (where)
-
Kiel
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fanti, Luciano
- Buccella, Domenico
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Time of origin
- 2017
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