Do workers benefit from wage transparency rules?

Arbeitspapier

Wage transparency rules arguably enable workers better to assess their contribution to firm value, allowing them to make wage demands that more accurately reflect their value for the employing firm and to lower wage gaps in turn. This paper contains a formal analysis of transparency rules and their effects on wages. We find that these rules induce firms to behave strategically with the aim of manipulating the information workers receive. We identify a large class of rules that yield an identical equilibrium outcome. For productivity distributions with decreasing (increasing) hazard rate, transparency rules increase (potentially decrease) workers' payoff.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 105

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Labor Discrimination ; Labor Law ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Thema: Wage-setting ; transparency rule ; payoff ; strategic effect ; learning effect

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gürtler, Oliver ; Struth, Lennart
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (wo): Bonn and Cologne
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237350
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ