Ontogenetic emergence as a criterion for theories of consciousness: Comparing GNW, SOMA, and REFCON

Abstract: In recent years increasing attention has been given to systematic comparison of theories of consciousness. Laudable practical projects have emerged in this regard, such as adversarial collaboration and the development of databases lending themselves to comparisons of empirical support for theories. In addition to the practical advances, theoretical advances have been made, such as a list of issues a theory of consciousness must address. We propose adding the issue of the ontogenetic emergence (O-emergence) of consciousness to the list of issues we use to evaluate theories of consciousness. O-emergence concerns how and when consciousness emerges ontogenetically in human beings. The underlying assumption is that there exists a point in the development of a human individual before which that individual is not and cannot be conscious. This assumption, in turn, depends on a widely shared assumption of cognitive neuroscience, which is that consciousness somehow depends on — or derives fr.... https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/9902

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Ontogenetic emergence as a criterion for theories of consciousness: Comparing GNW, SOMA, and REFCON ; volume:4 ; year:2023 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 4 (2023)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger ; Overgaard, Morten

Further information

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.9902
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023120617541467877359
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:39 AM CEST