Arbeitspapier
Differential delivery dates, retrievability and the incentives compatibility of contracts
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as Coase's 'ownership', Williamson's 'hostage', Klein et al's "vertical ownership", Grossman and Hart's "assignment of residual rights", etc have been proposed. The principal's decision to appropriate the quasi-rent generated by the agent delivering effort first under possibly weak public ordering and non-zero retrievability of delivered effort is explicitly modeled. We give the sufficient conditions for the preservation of the incentives compatibility of the simple P-A effort-in-advance contract in the D3 environment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UPSE Discussion Paper ; No. 2015-04
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Incomplete Markets
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
incentives compatibility
quasi-rent appropriation
retrievability
incentives contract
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fabella, Raul V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
- (wo)
-
Quezon City
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fabella, Raul V.
- University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
Entstanden
- 2015
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Incentives in Government Contracts
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
R&D Incentives, Compatibility and Network Externalities
R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Blockchain electricity trading using tokenised power delivery contracts
Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts
Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
Insurance and incentives in labor contracts : a study in the theory of implicit contracts
Globally incentives-compatible contracts under weak third party enforcement
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Incentives in Government Contracts
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
R&D Incentives, Compatibility and Network Externalities
R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Blockchain electricity trading using tokenised power delivery contracts
Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts
Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
Insurance and incentives in labor contracts : a study in the theory of implicit contracts
Globally incentives-compatible contracts under weak third party enforcement
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Incentives in Government Contracts
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
R&D Incentives, Compatibility and Network Externalities
R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Blockchain electricity trading using tokenised power delivery contracts
Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts
Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
Insurance and incentives in labor contracts : a study in the theory of implicit contracts