The relation of Peirce’s abduction to inference to the best explanation

Abstract: Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is closely related to his conception of abduction. The acquisition of the actual effect required by the method of scientific reasoning expressed by Peirce’s maxim must be accomplished by resorting to abductive logic. Abductive logic starts from a surprising fact, derives a hypothetical explanation about that fact, and finally arrives at the possibility that the hypothesis is true. This is the process of abductive reasoning, as provided by Peirce, which is distinct from induction and deduction and generates explanatory views. Peirce opposed a unified and unchangeable concept of causality. He used different interpretations of causality to illustrate the considerable differences in people’s understanding of cause and effect in different periods. The concept of pragmatism, as developed from the pragmatic maxim to abduction and then to scientific inference to the best explanation, is precisely what Peirce initially proposed, and inference to the best explanation is the starting point and the final result of the pragmatic maxim.

Objekt anzeigen

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: The relation of Peirce’s abduction to inference to the best explanation ; volume:20 ; number:3 ; year:2024 ; pages:485-496 ; extent:12 ; Chinese Semiotic Studies ; 20, Heft 3 (2024), 485-496 (gesamt 12)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Jiang, Yi

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/css-2024-2022
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409071607276.215016360400
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.