A product market theory of worker training

Arbeitspapier

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is suffciently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0214

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
• Thema: general training ; human capital ; oligopoly ; turnover ; Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement ; Bildungsinvestition ; Humankapital ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Schmutzler, Armin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76143
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ