Term limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?

Arbeitspapier

According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2199

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policy ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Subject: term limits ; comparative politics ; fiscal policy ; Finanzpolitik ; Regelgebundene Politik ; Öffentliche Schulden ; Systemvergleich ; Schätzung ; USA ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dalle Nogare, Chiara ; Ricciuti, Roberto
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET