Modelling zero bids in contingent valuation surveys

Arbeitspapier

When modelling data generated from a discrete choice contingent valuation question, the treatment of zero bids affects the welfare estimates. Zero bids may come from respondents who are not interested in the provision of the public good; alternatively, some zero-bidders may be protesting about the valuation exercise, but hold positive values for the good. In this paper we investigate the effect of different levels of information on zero-bidders on welfare estimates for the population. We find that different strategies of identification may have non-trivial effects. We recommend use of full debriefing questions for zero-bidders, and use of sample selection models to correct for bias caused by protest behaviour.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 55. 2000

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions ; Model Construction and Estimation ; Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access ; Welfare Economics: General ; Public Goods ; Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
• Thema: Contingent valuation ; zero bids ; protest votes ; selectivity bias ; sample selection model ; survey design ; Willingness to pay ; Präferenztheorie ; Theorie ; Statistisches Auswahlverfahren

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Strazzera, Elisabetta ; Scarpa, Riccardo ; Calia, Pinuccia ; Garrod, Guy ; Willis, Ken
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155109
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ