Arbeitspapier

Identifying the degree of collusion under proportional reduction

Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice in which cartel members reduce their output proportionately. We develop a method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario and relate the reduction to the traditional conduct parameter. Our measure is continuous, allowing us to have an intuitive interpretation as the "degree of collusion" and nesting the earlier models in the existing literature. Furthermore, our methodology addresses Corts' (1999) critique by estimating timevarying degree of collusion from a short panel of firm-level observations, exploiting firms' ex post heterogeneity. We illustrate the method using the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel data.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2017-51

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
Subject
Econometric and statistical methods
Market structure and pricing

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Shcherbakov, Oleksandr
Wakamori, Naoki
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2017-51
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Shcherbakov, Oleksandr
  • Wakamori, Naoki
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2017

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