Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung
Abstract: In acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung ; volume:11 ; number:2 ; year:1989 ; pages:179-196 ; extent:18
Analyse & Kritik ; 11, Heft 2 (1989), 179-196 (gesamt 18)
- Urheber
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Leist, Anton
- DOI
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10.1515/auk-1989-0204
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171549046.838460604946
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 14.08.2025, 10:54 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Leist, Anton