Arbeitspapier
Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation
In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 474
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Common pool resources
experiments
fairness
reciprocity
game theory
fairness models
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Falk, Armin
Fehr, Ernst
Fischbacher, Urs
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Falk, Armin
- Fehr, Ernst
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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