Arbeitspapier

Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 385

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Design
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Thema
Walrasian equilibrium
pseudomarkets
market design
revelation principle
welfare theorems
equilibrium existence
discrete markets
complementarities
constraints

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Miralles, Antonio
Pycia, Marek
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-203236
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Miralles, Antonio
  • Pycia, Marek
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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