Arbeitspapier
Promiscuous elites and economic development
This paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed the revolving door in English, pantouflage in French, and amakudari [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012-09
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Structure and Scope of Government: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Institutions and Growth
- Thema
-
elites
bureaucracy
abuse of power
revolving door
economic growth
Elite
Bürokratie
Arbeitsmobilität
Privatwirtschaft
Macht
Soziales Verhalten
Wirtschaftswachstum
Institutionalismus
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brezis, Elise S.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Ramat-Gan
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brezis, Elise S.
- Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012