Arbeitspapier

Promiscuous elites and economic development

This paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed the revolving door in English, pantouflage in French, and amakudari [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012-09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure and Scope of Government: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Institutions and Growth
Thema
elites
bureaucracy
abuse of power
revolving door
economic growth
Elite
Bürokratie
Arbeitsmobilität
Privatwirtschaft
Macht
Soziales Verhalten
Wirtschaftswachstum
Institutionalismus
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brezis, Elise S.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Ramat-Gan
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brezis, Elise S.
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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