Arbeitspapier

Promiscuous elites and economic development

This paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed the revolving door in English, pantouflage in French, and amakudari [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012-09

Classification
Wirtschaft
Structure and Scope of Government: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Institutions and Growth
Subject
elites
bureaucracy
abuse of power
revolving door
economic growth
Elite
Bürokratie
Arbeitsmobilität
Privatwirtschaft
Macht
Soziales Verhalten
Wirtschaftswachstum
Institutionalismus
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Brezis, Elise S.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(where)
Ramat-Gan
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Brezis, Elise S.
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2012

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