The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.

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• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: KIT Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 120

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: information avoidance ; morality ; unethical behavior ; social norms

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Serra-Garcia, Marta ; Szech, Nora
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
• (wo): Karlsruhe
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5445/IR/1000089263
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191255
• URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-892634