Arbeitspapier

The political economy of geographical indications

In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: LICOS Discussion Paper ; No. 372

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Deconinck, Koen
Huysmans, Martijn
Swinnen, Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance
(wo)
Leuven
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Deconinck, Koen
  • Huysmans, Martijn
  • Swinnen, Johan
  • Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance

Entstanden

  • 2015

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