Arbeitspapier
Regulating financial networks under uncertainty
I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when there is uncertainty regarding its precise structure. I show that such uncertainty reduces the scope for welfare-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can improve welfare. The size and composition of such a set crucially depend on the interplay between (i) the (expected) susceptibility of the network to contagion, (ii) the cost of improving network transparency, (iii) the cost of regulating institutions, and (iv) investors' preferences.
- ISBN
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978-92-9472-128-0
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 107
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Financial Crises
- Thema
-
Financial networks
contagion
policy design under uncertainty
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ramírez, Carlos
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
- (wo)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
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doi:10.2849/331905
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ramírez, Carlos
- European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
Entstanden
- 2020