Arbeitspapier
Regulating financial networks under uncertainty
I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when there is uncertainty regarding its precise structure. I show that such uncertainty reduces the scope for welfare-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can improve welfare. The size and composition of such a set crucially depend on the interplay between (i) the (expected) susceptibility of the network to contagion, (ii) the cost of improving network transparency, (iii) the cost of regulating institutions, and (iv) investors' preferences.
- ISBN
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978-92-9472-128-0
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 107
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Financial Crises
- Subject
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Financial networks
contagion
policy design under uncertainty
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ramírez, Carlos
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.2849/331905
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ramírez, Carlos
- European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
Time of origin
- 2020