Arbeitspapier

Regulating financial networks under uncertainty

I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when there is uncertainty regarding its precise structure. I show that such uncertainty reduces the scope for welfare-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can improve welfare. The size and composition of such a set crucially depend on the interplay between (i) the (expected) susceptibility of the network to contagion, (ii) the cost of improving network transparency, (iii) the cost of regulating institutions, and (iv) investors' preferences.

ISBN
978-92-9472-128-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 107

Classification
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Financial Crises
Subject
Financial networks
contagion
policy design under uncertainty

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ramírez, Carlos
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.2849/331905
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ramírez, Carlos
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision

Time of origin

  • 2020

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