Rent-sharing, hold-up, and wages: Evidence from matched panel data

Arbeitspapier

It is widely believed that rent-sharing reduces the incentives for investment when long term contracts are infeasible because some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. We propose a simple test for the degree of hold-up based on the fraction of capital costs that are deducted from the quasi-rent that determines negotiated wages. We implement the test using a data set that combines Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy with detailed financial information for employers. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to current profitability of the firm of 3-7%, arising mainly from firms in concentrated industries. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6086

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Thema: rent-sharing ; hold-up ; employer-employee data ; Sunk Costs ; Lohnpolitik ; Produktivität ; Arbeitsangebot ; Arbeitsnachfrage ; Matching ; Betriebliche Investitionspolitik ; Italien

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Card, David ; Devicienti, Francesco ; Maida, Agata
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58840
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201111213134
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ