Arbeitspapier
Elites and institutional persistence
Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.
- ISBN
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978-92-9230-323-5
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2010/85
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
Institutions and Growth
- Thema
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elites
political economy
persistence of institutions
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Robinson, James A.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
- (wo)
-
Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Robinson, James A.
- The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Entstanden
- 2010