Arbeitspapier

Elites and institutional persistence

Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.

ISBN
978-92-9230-323-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2010/85

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
Institutions and Growth
Thema
elites
political economy
persistence of institutions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Robinson, James A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Robinson, James A.
  • The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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