Elites and institutional persistence

Arbeitspapier

Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-92-9230-323-5
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2010/85

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative ; Institutions and Growth
• Subject: elites ; political economy ; persistence of institutions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Robinson, James A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54177
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET