Arbeitspapier

International trade, factor mobility and the persistence of cultural-institutional diversity

Cultural and institutional differences among nations may result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and thus be the basis of specialization and comparative advantage, as long as these differences are not eliminated by trade. We provide an evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and institutions under autarchy, trade and factor mobility in which multiple asymptotically stable cultural-institutional conventions may exist, among which transitions may occur as a result of decentralized and un-coordinated actions of employers or employees. We show that: i) specialization and trade may arise and enhance welfare even when the countries are identical other than their cultural-institutional equilibria; ii) trade liberalization does not lead to convergence, it reinforces the cultural-institutional differences upon which comparative advantage is based and may thus impede even Pareto-improving cultural-institutional transitions; and iii) by contrast, greater mobility of factors of production favors decentralized transitions to a superior cultural-institutional convention by reducing the minimum number of cultural or institutional innovators necessary to induce a transition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-08

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Economic Integration
Trade and Labor Market Interactions
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
institutions
incomplete contracts
evolutionary game theory
culture
trade integration
factor mobility
globalization
Außenwirtschaft
Internationale Arbeitsteilung
Faktormobilität
Kulturelle Identität
Institutionalismus
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Globalisierung
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Belloc, Marianna
Bowles, Samuel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(wo)
Amherst, MA
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Belloc, Marianna
  • Bowles, Samuel
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2009

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