Arbeitspapier

Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets.

We have experimentally tested a theory of bounded rational behavior in a "lemon market". It provides an explanation for the observation that real world players successfully conclude transactions when perfect rationality predicts a market collapse. We analyzed two different market designs : complete and partial market collapse. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from these theoretical predictions. In both markets, the participants traded more than theoretically predicted. Thus, the actual outcome is closer to efficiency than the theoretical prediction. Even after 20 repetitions of the first market constellation, the number of transactions did not drop to zero. Our bounded rationality approach to explain these observations starts with the insight that perfect rationality would require the players to perform an infinite number of iterative reasoning steps. Bounded rational players, however, carry out only a limited number of such iterations. We have determined the iteration type of the players independently from their market behavior. A significant correlation exists between iteration types and observed price offers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
guessing games
beauty contests
market failure
adverse selection
lemon problem
regulatory failure
paternalistic regulation
Marktmechanismus
Asymmetrische Information
Adverse Selection
Beschränkte Rationalität
Spieltheorie
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kirstein, Annette
Kirstein, Roland
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
(wo)
Saarbrücken
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kirstein, Annette
  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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