Arbeitspapier

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to highter expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower benefits reduce the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with lower benefits also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 514

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Nominal wage flexibility
contracts length
macroeconomic fluctuations
unemployment benefits

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Calmfors, Lars
Johansson, Åsa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Calmfors, Lars
  • Johansson, Åsa
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

Ähnliche Objekte (12)