Arbeitspapier

Win shift lose stay: An experimental test of non-compete clauses

We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on working efforts. The employee can invest into the probability of making a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation (Win) the employee may want to leave the firm (Shift) whereas after an innovation failure (Lose) he may remain (Stay) . In the treatments with non-compete clause, but not in the baseline, the employer can prevent successful innovators from leaving the firm. With standard preferences, effort should be lower if the worker cannot leave the firm, except if compulsory compensation for having to stay is very high. By contrast we find no reduction in effort even if compensation is low. Employers anticipate the incentive problem and pay a higher wage which employees reciprocate by higher effort.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2013/17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Firm Behavior: Theory
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
Thema
reciprocity
fairness
labor relations
non compete clause
non compete covenant

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bünstorf, Guido
Engel, Christoph
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bünstorf, Guido
  • Engel, Christoph
  • Fischer, Sven
  • Güth, Werner
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2013

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