Arbeitspapier
Vertical organization, technology flows and R&D incentives: an exploratory analysis
Despite its importance, the impact of vertical organization on innovation incentives has not been investigated in depth. This paper develops a number of testable hypotheses and then provides a first exploratory empirical analysis, using cross-sectional industry-level data. Two simple stylized facts emerge from the empirical results. First, once a fragmented buyer industry is dependent on a relatively concentrated supply sector, the industry’s own R&D intensity is reduced substantially. Second, vertical technology flows appear to act as substitutes for an industry's own R&D if the receiving industry's concentration is relatively low. Both results are largely consistent with a number of case studies and with theoretical arguments discussed in the paper.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 98-2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Harhoff, Dietmar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Harhoff, Dietmar
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 1998
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