The Future of Epistemic Possibility

Abstract: I am concerned with epistemic possibility expressions (EPEs) such as \It might be raining." Much of the discussion of EPEs has concerned the fact that a given EPE can seem true in one context and false in another. Motivated by this data, contextualists have argued that modal expressions are sensitive to information at a context of use. Contextualist analyses encounter problems when it comes to disagreements centered on EPEs. Relativists such as John Mac- Farlane argue that epistemic modals are sensitive to information available to an assessor at a circumstance of evaluation. I side with a relativistic account of epistemic possibility, on which the truth conditions of EPEs depend not only on a context of use but also as on a context of assessment. The stipulation of contexts of assessments explains why third parties can judge an interlocutor's utterance false, and why the interlocutor will retract her previous utterance. However, judgements of falsity and retraction seem to be absent in future-oriented EPEs such as \It might rain tomorrow." I propose an amendment to John MacFarlane's semantics that better models this quirk of epistemic possibility expressions

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
The Future of Epistemic Possibility ; volume:31 ; number:1 ; year:2017 ; pages:44-61 ; extent:18
Kriterion ; 31, Heft 1 (2017), 44-61 (gesamt 18)

Urheber
Phillips, Meagan Lowell

DOI
10.1515/krt-2017-310104
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315425045426432
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
15.08.2025, 07:31 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Phillips, Meagan Lowell

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