Arbeitspapier
Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions
The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1315
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Auctions
- Subject
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Simultaneous Ascending Auction
weak dominance
multi-unit auctions
game theory
Auktionstheorie
Vollkommene Information
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Riedel, Frank
- Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2004