Arbeitspapier

Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions

The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1315

Classification
Wirtschaft
Rationing; Licensing
Auctions
Subject
Simultaneous Ascending Auction
weak dominance
multi-unit auctions
game theory
Auktionstheorie
Vollkommene Information
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Riedel, Frank
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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